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COMMENT
UNCONSCIOUS RACISM AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW
Sheri Lynn Johnsont
At most, [defendant's proof of racial discrimination] indicates a
discrepancy that appears to correlate with race. Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system.... Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal
process is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained
is invidious.'
The Court today sanctions the execution of a man despite his
presentation of evidence that establishes a constitutionally intolerable level of racially based2 discrimination leading to the imposition of his death sentence.
McCleskey v. Kemp 3 is shocking, but not surprising. Much has
been written about McCleskey. Most commentators agree that it is
wrong, and they painstakingly map out all the points at whichJustice
Powell's opinion goes wrong. 4 I agree that it is very wrong, but
what I want to focus on is how McCleskey fits into the larger picture
of race and criminal procedure. I think McCleskey is the consequence
of a large blindspot, a blindspot that mars the reasoning of all of the
recent cases involving both race and criminal procedure, a blindspot
that also distorts the Court's gestalt in more traditional equal prot Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1975, University of Minnesota; J.D.
1979, Yale Law School. I am grateful to John Andrew Siliciano, and to my research
assistant, Irving Sepulveda.
1 McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1777-78 (1987).
2 Id. at 1794 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
3
107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
4
See, e.g., S. GROSS & R. MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES
IN CAPTAL SENTENCING (1988); Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, CapitalPunishment
and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988); The Supreme Court, 1986 TermLeading Cases, 101 HARv. L. REV. 119, 155-59 (1987); Note, Social Science Statistics in the
Courtroom: The Debate Resurfaces in McCleskey v. Kemp, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 688
(1987); Bedau, Someday McCleskey Will Be Death Penalty's Dred Scott, L.A. Times, May 1,
1987, § 2, at 5, col. 1. As Kennedy, notes, the bitter criticism of the Supreme Court's
decision was foreshadowed by the overwhelmingly negative response to the lower
courts' decisions in the case. Kennedy, supra, at 1389; see also Carter, When Victims Happen
to be Black, 97 YALE LJ. 420, 440-47 (1988) (criticizing majority opinion for its callousness to black victims, but accepting outcome for McCleskey as inevitable).

1016

1988]

UNCONSCIOUS RACISM

1017

tection cases. In that blindspot is the empirical reality of unconscious racism.
This Comment begins by discussing the flaws in other recent
decisions involving both race and criminal procedure, then speculates about the sources of the blindspot that I think is responsible
for those flaws, and, finally, tries to link this blindspot to the ongoing debate concerning discriminatory purpose and disparate effect
in the equal protection literature.
I
THE BLINDSPOT IN RECENT RACE AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE DECISIONS

At first glance, McCleskey stands alone. The Court has decided
three major race and criminal procedure cases in the last two years,
and in the other two, Turner v. Murray5 and Batson v. Kentucky, 6 the
Court mandated additional protections against racial discrimination.
It would be wrong to say that the victories in Turner and Batson do
not matter, but it is equally wrong to ignore how sharply limited
those victories are; the remedies in Turner and Batson are inadequate
for the same reason that McCleskey got no remedy at all.
A.

McCleskey v. Kemp

I need not detail what is wrong with McCleskey. Others have
done so far more exhaustively and persuasively than I could; 7 the
opinion is defensive and unpersuasive, and the outcome threatens
our communal sense ofjustice. What is important for my purpose is
to point out how attention to the phenomenon of unconscious racism would have altered Justice Powell's analysis under both the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and under the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment.
McCleskey grounded his eighth and his fourteenth amendment
claims on racial discrimination. By far the most important evidence
McCleskey proffered to demonstrate that Georgia's capital sentencing system is administered in a racially discriminatory manner was
the Baldus study. 8 Justice Powell accepted, at least arguendo, the
validity of the Baldus study. 9 The study, described by Justice Powell
5
6
7
8

476 U.S. 28 (1986).
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
See supra note 4.
It was not, however, the only evidence he proffered to show intentional discrimi-

nation. AsJustice Brennan's dissent noted, "Georgia's legacy of a race-conscious criminal justice system" is extraordinary. McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1786 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
9 Id. at 1766 n.7 (majority opinion).
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as "sophisticated,"' 10 examined over 2000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970s. 11 The raw data showed substantial disparities in the imposition of the death penalty depending
on the victim's race, and smaller disparities associated with the defendant's race.' 2 Because of the possibility, indeed likelihood, of
spurious correlations,' 3 Baldus subjected his data to extensive analysis, considering 230 variables that could have explained the disparities on nonracial grounds.' 4 One of his models controlled for the
effects of all 230 variables; another model incorporated thirty-nine
nonracial variables.' 5 Justice Powell's opinion appears to accept, at
16
least for purposes of discussion, the latter.
When he controlled for thirty-nine nonracial variables, Baldus
found that, in Georgia, defendants charged with killing white victims
were 4.3 times more likely to be condemned to death than defendants charged with killing black victims, and that black defendants
were 1.1 times more likely to receive the death penalty than white
defendants. 17 Justice Powell deemed these statistics insufficient
proof of the purposeful discrimination necessary to demonstrate a
.violation of the equal protection clause, and also insufficient to
demonstrate the "constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the . . . capital-sentencing process ' impermissible under
the cruel and unusual punishment clause.
Regarding the equal protection claim, Powell noted that statistical disparities ordinarily must be "stark" to be accepted as the sole
proof of discriminatory intent;' 9 apparently a 300 or 400 percent
overrepresentation in the ranks of the condemned is not stark
enough even when that overrepresentation cannot be explained in a
noninvidious way. He then refused to broaden the category of cases
in which not-so-extreme statistical patterns are accepted as sufficient
proof of the prohibited intent, a category currently composed of Ti10

Id. at 1763.

11

Id.

Id.
A spurious correlation is a statistical association between two variables that appears to reflect a causal relationship between those variables, but actually results from
the association of both variables with a third variable.
14
Id. at 1764.
15
Id. A model that incorporates more variables is not necessarily superior to one
that uses fewer variables.
16
Id.
17
Id. As Justice Blackmun's dissent pointed out, Baldus found the race of the victim to be as powerful an explanation for the imposition of the death sentence as is a
prior murder conviction or acting as the principal planner of a homicide. Id. at 1800
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
18
Id. at 1778 (majority opinion).
19 Id. at 1767.
12
13
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tie VII and jury selection cases. 20 He distinguished those cases primarily on the basis that the decisions involved were less
21
complicated.
Powell disposed of the cruel and unusual punishment claim
with closely analogous reasoning. Stressing the need for discretion
in capital sentencing, he reasoned that apparent discrepancies are
the inevitable result of such discretion. He interpreted the Baldus
study as "[a]t most .

.

. indicat[ing] a discrepancy that appears to

race,"' 22

correlate with
insisting that "[w]e decline to assume that
23
that which is unexplained is invidious."
The phenomenon of unconscious racism challenges both Powell's fourteenth and his eighth amendment analyses. The concept of
purposeful discrimination, or at least its terminology, does not mesh
well with unconscious race discrimination. I consider this problem
more fully below, 24 but note here that the nature and prevalence of
unconscious racism threatens both steps of Powell's equal protection argument. First, cognizance of the frequency with which racial
stereotypes alter judgment should influence how "stark" a statistical
disparity must be to raise a presumption of a race-based decision,
particularly where, as here, noninvidious explanations have been
exhausted.
Second, awareness of the way in which unconscious racism
functions should militate in favor of a decision to expand the category of cases in which stark disparities are not required. The multiplicity of factors that enter sentencing decisions and the consequent
need for discretion may make the inference of race-based decisionmaking riskier in the sentencing context than where only a few permissible considerations enter into a decision, as Powell argued. 25
However, it also increases the likelihood that race will play a role in
the decision: the greater number of factors allows the conscious but
covert racist to conceal his or her motives, and the difficulty of
weighing all the factors allows the well-intentioned unconscious ra26
cist to be influenced-at the margin-by race.

20

Id

Id at 1767-68.
Id. at 1777.
23
Id at 1779.
24
See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
25
107 S. Ct. at 1767-68. Professor Kennedy reviews each of the distinctions cited
by the majority opinion, and argues that they are weak even on their own terms. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1427-29.
26
McConahay, Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale, in PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 116-20 (J. Dovidio & S. Gaertner eds. 1986); see also infra
notes 66-74 & 89-90 and accompanying text.
This is probably why the race of the victim has its greatest effect in the "middlerange" cases. See 107 S. Ct. at 1764 n.5 (Baldus divided cases into ranges according to
21
22
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On the eighth amendment front, the phenomenon of unconscious racism provides a compelling "explanation" of the data Powell claimed to find unexplained and, therefore, presumptively
noninvidious. In one sense, race itself is the explanation: the race
of the victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant, explain some of the variation in the imposition of death sentences.
Accepting the validity of the Baldus study, which Powell claimed to
do, means accepting this explanation. If what Powell meant is that
Baldus has not explained why race influences capital sentencing decisions, then unconscious racism provides that explanation. What is
known about unconscious racism-its prevalence, its sources, and
the ways in which it is manifested-can explain not only the strength
of the race-of-victim effect, but also the counterintuitive finding that
the defendant's race does not affect capital sentencing decisions as
27
much as does the victim's race.
Of course, the reason that race influences a decisionmaker, or
even the way in which it influences that decisionmaker, would not
seem relevant if one accepts that race has affected the decision. Perhaps Powell really did not mean to accept the validity of the Baldus
study, but only the reliability of its data collection and the correctness of its statistical analysis. If so, Powell meant that race may not
cause the discrepancies observed. If this is what he meant, then he
needed to explain why he rejected the study's conclusions even
though he accepted its methodology. There are two obvious possibilities: first, that the correlation between race of the victim and
sentence is spurious, and the apparent effect of race is really caused
aggravation level of offense). Because middle-range decisions are the most complicated,
race may play a decisive, yet unobtrusive role in the decisionmaking process. See id at
1806 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (if Georgia were to narrow class of death-eligible defendants to categories of extremely serious crimes, danger of discriminatory application of
death penalty would be significantly decreased).
27 The typical unconscious racist does not feel particularly punitive toward minorities. Instead, he or she wishes to maintain distance and is less likely to feel empathy for
minorities due to this distance. See, e.g.,J. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM 121-24 (1972);
Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L.
REV. 673, 687-90 (1985); see also Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, Deindividualizationand AngerMediated InterracialAggression: Unmasking Regressive Racism, 41J. PERSONALTY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 63 (1981). Rogers and Prentice-Dunn discuss one facet of modem racism,
which they label "regressive racism." The regressive racist claims to accept egalitarian
norms and behaves consistently with those norms in most situations. Id. However, in
situations in which anger is aroused, the regressive racist reverts to traditional patterns
of racial discrimination. Id. White-victim cases would seem to be a situation in which
anger would be aroused.
Although race of the defendant is not an important predictor in capital-sentencing
decisions, we should not assume that discrimination based on the race of the defendant
has disappeared; such discrimination persists at the guilt attribution stage and is probably caused by the unconscious influence of stereotypes. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
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by some other, unexamined variable; or second, that the explanation of race as a cause is so implausible that we should conclude
that an event of minuscule probability has occurred-the correlation
reflects only chance. 28 With no competing explanations-and Justice Powell offered none because he could not, given the 39 variables Baldus controlled for and the nearly 200 more he
investigated-and with the phenomenon of unconscious racism rendering race-based decisionmaking entirely plausible-it becomes
virtually impossible to reject the invidious and unconstitutional explanation: racial discrimination.
B.

Turner v. Murray

Turner v. Murray,29 decided in 1986, is only marginally better
than McCleskey in result, is similarly flawed in its empirical premises,
and is, doctrinally speaking, a mess. Turner, a black defendant convicted and sentenced to death for murdering a white victim, had his
request to voir dire potential jurors concerning racial bias denied.
The Court held that this denial invalidated his capital sentence, but
not his conviction. Justice White explained that three factors-the
interracially violent crime, the broad discretion given the jury at the
death penalty hearing, and the special seriousness of the risk of improper sentencing in a capital case-rendered the risk of racial prejudice unacceptablefor the capital sentencingproceeding.3 0 With respect
to the guilt phase of Turner's trial, however, White concluded that
the risks of prejudice infecting the decision were no greater than
with other noncapital interracial offenses, and hence insufficient to
compel inquiry into racial bias. 3 ' To say the least, this reasoning is
troubling. As Justice Brennan, dissenting in part, pointed out:
Implicit in the Court's judgment is the acknowledgment that there
was a likelihood that the jury that pronounced the death sentence
acted, in part, on the basis of racial prejudice. But the exact same
jury convicted Turner. Does the Court really mean to suggest
that the constitutional entitlement to an impartial jury attaches
only at the sentencing phase? Does the Court really believe that
racial biases are turned on and off in the course of one criminal
32
prosecution?
Justices Powell and Rehnquist, also dissenting in part, noted the
28 Of course, even with statistically significant correlations, there is a possibility,
albeit very small, that chance is responsible for the association.
29 476 U.S. 28 (1986).

Id. at 37.
Id at 37-38. As Justice White noted, this is consistent with the Court's earlier
decision in Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976), a black defendant, white victim noncapital case in which the Court upheld a refusal to grant voir dire on racial prejudice.
32 Turner, at 43 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
30
31
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same inconsistency, but drew the opposite conclusion: there was
no reason to "presume racial bias" at the sentencing stage for the
same reason there was no reason to presume such bias at the guilt
33
determination phase.
We could view this decision as simply another split-the-difference compromise, and on a polarized court, such compromises are
not infiequent. 34 In Turner, however, I think we see more than just a
pragmatic balancing of values and views. This compromise can be
justified; its justification, however, rests upon a false empirical
premise. If racial bias were an exceptional occurrence and if it were
largely composed of conscious hostility towards persons of other
races, then we would expect that in an "ordinary" decision determining the "facts" of guilt, prejudice would be much less likely to
operate than in a decision regarding how to punish a person. But
these assumptions are both empirically wrong: race affects the thinking of virtually everyone in this society, and for more and more people, this influence is neither conscious nor motivated by hostility.
Ironically, the empirical evidence says that Justice White got it exactly backward. If we look at mock jury studies examining the effects of the defendant's race on jurors' decisions, it appears that the
defendant's race affects guilt determinations more often than it affects sentences; it is the subtle, unconscious alteration ofjudgment,
not the conscious desire to injure, that most threatens the fair ad35
ministration of the criminal justice system.
C.

Batson v. Kentucky

The first of the three major race and criminal procedure decisions in the last two years, Batson v. Kentucky, 36 held that a prosecutor's racially motivated exercise of the peremptory challenge
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Without diminishing Batson's significance-I think the symbolic importance of overturning Swain v. Alabama3 7 is enough reason to applaud, even if there are no practical consequences-I would argue
that it is flawed by the same premises that determine McCleskey and
mar Turner.
At the very least, Batson is flawed by the assumption that merely
33

Id. at 52 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan so characterizes the decision. Ide at 44 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
35 See Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1611, 1625-38
(1985) (reviewing literature); see also Developments in the Law: Race and the CriminalProcess,
101 HAgv. L. REv. 1472, 1603, 1625 (1988) [hereinafter Developments].
36 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
37 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Swain held that a black defendant was not denied equal
34

protection by the State's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the
petit jury, absent proof of systematic exclusion of black jurors in case after case.

1988]

UNCONSCIOUS RACISM

1023

allowing defendants to challenge the racially discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges in individual cases will end the illegitimate
use of the peremptory challenge. Justice Marshall, concurring, rejected the Court's limited remedy because of the huge practical obstacles the majority would require the defendant to surmount to
gain relief. First, he noted that only flagrant abuses of the peremptory challenge will establish a prima facie case, so that in those jurisdictions where only one or two black jurors survive challenges for
cause, the prosecutor is free to strike them from the jury because of
their race.3 8 Second, he observed that even when the defendant can
establish a prima facie case, the trial court will face a difficult burden in assessing the prosecutor's motives; other explanations will be
easy to generate.3 9 The majority responded to these concerns in a
footnote:
We have no reason to believe that prosecutors will not fulfill their
duty to exercise their challenges only for legitimate purposes.
Certainly, this Court may assume that trial judges, in supervising
voir dire in light of our decision today, will be alert to identify a
40
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.
This response would be satisfactory if racial bias were an exceptional occurrence easily detected by any well-intentioned observer.
As Justice Marshall pointed out, however, the danger is not limited
to outright prevarication. An attorney might lie to himself or herself
to justify his or her actions; conscious or unconscious racism may
lead him or her to conclude that a prospective black juror is "sullen" or "distant" on the basis of behavior that would not have
prompted the same conclusion had the juror been white. 4 1 Moreover, a judge's own conscious or unconscious racism might prompt
42
acceptance of such an explanation.
The majority did not-because it could not-respond to Marshall's assertions about the prevalence of racism, particularly unconscious racism. Social scientists would tell us that Marshall is right,
and his prediction is borne out by Batson's early progeny. Prosecutors are already asserting flimsy justifications for exercising their
challenges against black jurors, 43 and judges sometimes uphold
these excuses. For example, one court held that the following ex476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).
39 Id- at 105-06.
40
Id. at 99 n.22 (majority opinion).
41
I& at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
42 Id
43
See, e.g., State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Wallace v. State, 41
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2019 (Ala. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 1987); Branch v. State, 526 So.2d
605 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
38
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planations rebutted the defendant's prima facie case of
discrimination:
[A] young black female was struck because she was a homemaker
and 'may have trouble making the necessary judgments that have
to be made and that is the knowledge of what life is like out on the
street'; a young black female who is a student made no indication
that she was working and 'would have not have the necessary experience to be able to draw on to make a judgment in this case';
an older black female who was retired and 'maybe overly sympathetic based on the fact that she appeared to be a grandmotherly
type;' a young black male who had a beard and 'I [the prosecutor]
tend to think that people that have beards are somehow those that
try to go against the grain,' and also, 'both of the defense attorneys have beards and I felt like that he would somehow identify
with the defense attorneys and would therefore lean in their direction'; a middle-aged, black male who was not working and 'may be
somewhat irresponsible'; and a middle-aged black female who was
some type of supervisor and appeared to be in the same age
44
group as the defendants' parents or mothers.
I would expect that, sometimes consciously and sometimes unconsciously, prosecutors will develop more sophisticated excuses for
striking black jurors.
Ultimately, how much progress will Batson make in eliminating
the racially motivated exercise of the peremptory challenge? I
would guess not a great deal. And eliminating the racially motivated
use of the peremptory challenge was a very modest goal. As I have
argued at length elsewhere, I think that awareness of the data on
race and guilt attribution, coupled with an understanding of unconscious racism, compels the conclusion that what black defendants
45
need is not purification of voir dire procedures, but black jurors.
In my view, McCleskey, Turner, and Batson are only the most obvious and most recent examples of the failure to attend to the impact
of unconscious racism on the criminal justice system. Slightly older
decisions involving the intersection of race and criminal procedure
reveal the same blindspot. In the fourth amendment area, United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce4 6 purports to sanction a limited use of race in
suspected immigration violation detentions, apparently oblivious to
the likelihood of heavy and irrational reliance on Hispanic ethnicity
as a source of suspicion; 4 7 in Kolender v. Lawson, 48 the Court ignored
44
45
46
47

Wallace, 41 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2019-20.
Johnson, supra note 35.

422 U.S. 873 (1975).

See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563-64 (1976) (no constitutional violation where further questioning at border is based largely on apparent Mex-

ican ancestry due to minimal nature of intrusion involved and need for broad
discretion). For an account of Hispanic citizens' frustrating attempts to restrict Immi-
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the extraordinary racial discrimination faced by the plaintiff who
challenged California's stop-and-identify statute, apparently deeming it coincidence rather than an additional objection to such statutes. In the voir dire area, the cases preceding Turner, Ristaino v.
Ross 4 9 and Rosales-Lopez v. United States 50 exhibit the same naive reasoning concerning the dynamics of prejudice that underlies the decision in Turner, and in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court51 the
Court gratuitously criticized the length of the voir dire in a case im52
bued with extraordinary potential for inflaming racial prejudice.
In cases touching on cross-racial identification, the Court has also
sent the wrong signals. In Manson v. Brathwaite,5 3 it implied that
black-on-black identifications are particularly trustworthy,5 4 and in
Stovall v. Denno55 it ignored the increased likelihood of error generated by a white-on-black identification. 56 Arguably, some civil cases
concerning the criminal process, such as Los Angeles v. Lyons,5 7 are
also flawed by the failure to consider the effects of unconscious

racism.58

gration and Naturalization Service (INS) use of ethnicity to cases where there are other
indicators of suspicion, see Marquez v. Kiley, 436 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); for a
review of cases in which INS reliance dn race has been extreme, see Johnson, Race and
the Decision To Detain a Suspect, 93 YA.E LJ. 214, 232-33 (1983).
48
461 U.S. 352 (1983).
49
424 U.S. 589 (1976) (no consitutional violation to refuse to permit voir dire on
racial bias absent "special circumstances;" violent interracial crime does not constitute
special circumstances).
50 451 U.S. 182 (1981) (neither constitution nor supervisory power over federal
courts mandates per se rule requiring voir dire on racial prejudice in all cases with minority-race defendant).
51 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
52
Id at 510 n.9. Justice Marshall's concurrence criticizes the majority for its insensitivity to the potential for prejudice posed by a rape-strangulation murder of a 15 yearold white girl by a 26 year-old black man with a prior conviction for rape of an adolescent white girl. Id at 521-22 (Marshall, J., concurring).
53 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
54 Of course, black-on-black identifications are no more reliable than the most common identification pattern, white on white.
55
388 U.S. 293 (1967) (upholding extremely suggestive hospital room show-up
without mentioning additional unreliability caused by cross-racial nature of
identification).
56
For a review of the psychological data showing substantially higher rates of error
in cross-racial identifications, see Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal
Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934, 938-51 (1984).
57 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
58
The Court held that the plaintiff, a black male who had been subjected to a
chokehold, had no standing to challenge the city's policy of using life-threatening
chokeholds to subdue its citizens. As Justice Marshall's dissent noted, although only
nine percent of the residents of Los Angeles are black males, they have accounted for 75
percent of the deaths resulting from chokeholds. Id. at 116 n.3 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
The majority did not deem this disparity worthy of notice, or relevant to the question of
whether the plaintiff had a reasonable fear that he would again be injured by the practice
of using chokeholds. See also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (no case or contro-
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II
THE SOURCES OF THE BLINDSPOT

The obvious question is-why? Let me reject a few possible explanations first. Is there something particularly uncomfortable
about closely examining racism in the context of the criminal justice
system? I think not; looking back several decades, there was no hesitance to take note of the dynamics of race relations in the police
station or even the courtroom. In both the right to counsel cases5 9
and the involuntary confession cases, 60 the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that the defendant's race might subtly affect his ability to defend himself against governmental abuses of power.
Is it a reluctance to rely upon social science data in either equal
protection questions or in criminal procedure matters? Again, I
think the answer is "no." Precedent for using purely statistical data
is available in another area where equal protection doctrine and
criminal procedure questions intersect: the jury venire selection
cases. 6 1 Moreover, the Court has used softer, more "general" social
science findings to ground decisions in both areas. The obvious example in equal protection analysis is the school desegregation
63
cases, 6 2 and in the criminal procedure realm, the jury-size cases.
Finally, is it a recently developed reluctance, perhaps caused by
changes in Court membership, to probe race questions too deeply?
I think the Court's treatment of affirmative action cases-its unwillingness to simply set out the general contours of permissible proversy where plaintiffs alleged widespread illegal and unconstitutional police conduct
aimed at minority citizens).
59 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455,
463 (1942) (noting that Powell involved "ignorant and friendless negro youths").
60 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), and the six confession cases that directly followed it all involved black defendants. See Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942);
Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941); Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 (1941); White
v. Texas, 309 U.S. 631 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
61 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-96 (1977) (showing that population was
79.1 percent Mexican-American, but that over eleven-year period only 39 percent of
persons summoned for grand jury service were Mexican-American established prima
facie case of discrimination); see also Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (prima facie
case of discrimination may be made out by showing that substantial disparity between
minority group members in population and on jury list originated, at least in part, at
point in selection process where jury commissioners invoked subjective judgment).
62 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
Of course Brown, Williams, and Ballew have all been criticized and debated, at least in part
for their reliance on social science data. But at this juncture I only mean to point out
that such reliance is not so novel as to explain the Court's behavior, not to establish that
the reliance on such data is correct. My view, however, is that reliance on social science
data concerning race and criminal justice is less problematic than these prior disputed
uses. See Johnson, supra note 35, at 1704-05.
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grams, its obsession with resolving various factual variations-says
that this is not a sufficient explanation.6 Certainly the blindspot is
not caused by a general judicial reluctance to discuss racial issues
65
lest hostilities be inflamed.
This leaves us, I think, with the special properties of unconscious racism itself. Put differently, it is not the location of the blindspot, but its content. I am convinced that unconscious racism is
ignored in the reasoning of race and criminal procedure decisions
for three reasons, all linked to the nature of phenomenon itself: ignorance, fear, and denial.
A.

Ignorance

Ignorance is the first obstacle to taking account of unconscious
racism. To most judges, in fact to most of our society, "racial discrimination," "racism," "racial bias," and "racial prejudice" are the
property of the hate-filled, stereotype-spouting, put-them-in-theirplace white supremacist-what social scientists call the "dominative
racist." 66 Although the 1980's have brought something of a revival
of racially motivated violence against minority groups and an increase in the number of overtly racist organizations, 67 the general
perception that the ranks of these "traditional" racists are dwindling
is accurate. 68 As a society, we have largely rejected gross stereotypes and blatant discrimination, but this has not rid us of racism. A
burgeoning literature documents the rise of the "aversive" racist, 6 9
a person whose ambivalent racial attitudes leads him or her to deny
his or her prejudice and express it indirectly, 70 covertly, 71 and often
64 If one looks at the Supreme Court's docket in the last five years, one might easily
get the impression that the Court sees affirmative action as the most significant race
discrimination issue facing our society. This selection among race discrimination cases
clearly does reflect something about the Court's membership and the Justice's priorities,
see infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text, but the fact that the Court is hearing any
kind of race discrimination cases in relatively large numbers indicates that queasiness
about the societal consequences of highlighting such disputes is not the cause of the
Court's refusal to examine the consequences of unconscious racism.
65 Indeed, one would imagine that highlighting affirmative action cases engenders
more divisiveness than would highlighting almost any other subset of race discrimination cases.
66 J. JONES, supra note 27, at 121-24;J. KOVEL, WHrrE RACISM 54-55 (1970); Pettigrew, supra note 27, at 687.
67 Jones, An Argument ForFederalProtectionAgainst Racially Motivated Crimes: 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 and the Thirteenth Amendment, 21 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 689, 697-700 (1986).
68 See, e.g.,J.JoNES, supra note 27, at 121-22; McConahay & Hough, Symbolic Racism,
32(2) J. Soc. Issues 23, 39 (1976); Pettigrew, supra note 27, at 687-88 (reviewing poll
data).
69 J.JONES, supra note 27, at 121-24;J. KOVEL, supra note 66, at 54-55; Pettigrew,
supra note 27, at 687; McConahay & Hough, supra note 68, at 23-24 (using term "symbolic racism").
70 Crosby, Bromley & Saxe, Recent UnobtrusiveStudies of Black and White Discrimination

1028

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1016

unconsciously. 7 2

That literature, which does not come from one
narrow subfield of zealots but spans the chasms between Freudians,
cognitive psychologists, and sociologists, 73 also documents how per74
vasively and subtly race influences the thinking of us all.
Certainly current public awareness of the concept and dynamics
of unconscious racism is low. But public ignorance is not a sufficient
barrier to incorporating new insights about race into judicial thinking; the courts have been educated-and subsequently, educatorsbefore. 75 At least two members of the Court are aware of unconand Preudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 546, 554 (1980) (reviewing
aggression studies); McConahay & Hough, supra note 68, at 43; Pettigrew, supra note 27,
at 690, 694-700. Many whites agree with the goal of racial equality in principle, but
strongly object to and obstruct specific reforms aimed at implementing that principle. I.
KATz, STIGMA: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 14-16 (1981) (reviewing a variety of
studies); H. SCHUMAN, C. STEEH & L. BOBO, RACIAL ATTrUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND
INTERPRETATIONS 211-12 (1985); Pettigrew, supra note 27, at 689-91 (also reviewing a
variety of studies).
71
Strong public norms against racial prejudice compete with private norms that
endorse it. See H. SCHUMAN, C. STEEH & L. BOBO, supra note 70, at 202; Delgado, The
Ethereal Scholar:Does CriticalLegal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 301, 317-18 (1987). Discrimination is therefore most prevalent in private settings and public settings where it may be practiced without disclosure of prejudiced
attitudes. G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 56-57 (1954); H. SCHUMAN, C. STEEH
& L. BOBO, supra note 70, at 65 (discussing race-of-interviewer effects on reported racial
attitudes); Crosby, Bromley & Saxe, supra note 70, at 549, 554, 559 (reviewing helpingbehavior studies and studies examining effect on subjects' reported racial attitudes when
telling subjects that truthfulness of their statements is being monitored by sensitive lie
detector); Gaertner & Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM, supra note 26, at 80-84 (reviewing experiments on positive and negative rating scale studies and reaction time/rating scale studies); Sigall & Page, Current
Stereotypes: A Little Fading,A Little Faking, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 247
(1971).
72 Crosby, Bromley & Saxe, supra note 70, at 555-56 (reviewing nonverbal behavior
studies); Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 71, at 85 (reviewing a variety of studies and
concluding that aversive racists rationalize negative responses to minorities in ambiguous situations and thus maintain perception of themselves as egalitarian, unprejudiced,
and nondiscriminating); Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 329-32, 343 (reviewing the literature); McConahay & Hough, supra note 68, at 43-44.
73
The terminology differs among the various disciplines, as does the explanation
of the origin of unconscious racism, but all document the existence and prevalence of
the same phenomenon. For an excellent, brief description of the different causal theories of psychoanalytic theory and cognitive psychology, see Lawrence, supra note 72, at
331-39; for a comprehensive treatment of various motivational and cognitive approaches to the newer forms of racism, as well as a briefer treatment of institutional and
socio-cultural perspectives, see Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 71. See also Pettigrew,
supra note 27.
74
J. KOVEL, supra note 66, at 94; Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 71, at 317-18;
Lawrence, supra note 72, at 330-31.
75 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), is the most obvious example of
the Court leading and educating the public, and I think Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.

335 (1963), has served the same function regarding the right to counsel. Arguably, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), has also altered the public perception of proper
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scious racism: Justice Marshall's concurrence in Batson v. Kentucky 7 6
and Justice Brennan's dissent in Turner v. Murray77 allude to unconscious racism. Thus, ignorance alone does not explain the
blindspot.
B.

Fear

Justice Powell listed two "additional concerns" about McCleskey's claim as reasons for refusing to grant him relief,7 8 and one of
those reasons translates into the second source of the blindspot:
fear. Surmounting ignorance may feel dangerous here. After listing
a variety of challenges that might follow a grant of relief in McCleskey, Powell concluded "there is no limiting principle to the type of
challenge brought by McCleskey." 79 AsJustice Brennan noted, that
argument "seems to suggest a fear of too much justice." 80 He also
noted that the fear was not rational: at least in the short run, the
practical consequences of respecting McCleskey's claim would be
very limited. 8 1 Students of unconscious racism, however, would
predict irrational fear, or at least fear disproportionate to the
82
threat.
C.

Denial

A cautious person might respond that in the long run, we cannot predict what further data might be amassed and what other cherished institutions threatened.8 3 Still, I think this long term practical
police interrogation methods despite the continuing controversy over the decision's
correctness.
76 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
77 476 U.S. 28, 42 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Even the majority opinion comes close
to a recognition of unconscious racism when it alludes to "less consciously held racial
attitudes." Id. at 35 (majority opinion).
78
McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1779 (1987).
79 Id. at 1780.
80 Id at 1791 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81
Id. at 1792-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan pointed out that many
ofJustice Powell's hypotheticals did not involve race, which would render them subject
to a lesser degree of scrutiny, id. at 1792-93, and he noted that with regard to other
hypothesized race effects, the Baldus study provided documentation unavailable for
most any other kind of race discrimination claim. Id. at 1793.
82 A wide variety of measures and samples have found that the objective threat
posed by racial change is a poor predictor of white racial attitudes and behavior. Subjective threat, the dangers perceived from alterations in the racial status quo, is what motivates white opposition to racial change. Pettigrew, supra note 27, at 691 (reviewing
literature).
83 Although many commentators, I among them, would be glad to see the death
penalty abolished, the majority of public opinion favors retention. Views on the retention/abolition question are undifferentiated and emotional. These views probably do
not stem from a set of reasoned beliefs, but rather reflect the adherent's ideological selfimage. Ellsworth & Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment. A Close Examination of the
Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 1983 CRIME & DELINQ. 116, 167-69.
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risk is probably less inhibiting than the psychological risk: really, do
we want to acknowledge that racism infects us all? So we see the
third and probably most powerful reason for the blindspot: denial.
84
Denial, too, is a property of unconscious racism.
It is one thing to identify and castigate dominative racists: one8 5
feels morally superior. It is a different thing to ponder affirmative
action at length (what shall we do for them? haven't we done
enough already?): one feels generous and yet, prudent. But both
kinds of reflection are similar in one respect: they enhance the decisionmaker's self-image. In contrast, recognizing the ubiquity of unconscious racism cannot but detract from one's self-image. This is
particularly true for a person accustomed to thinking of racism as
immoral, even criminal (which in its conscious forms, it certainly
is) 8 6 -rather than as sick. Even if one makes the distinction between
conscious, unconscionable racism, and unconscious racism, it is
hardly ego-enhancing to think of oneself as the passive recipient of a
culturally pervasive illness. Here we may have a psychological variation of Professor Derrick Bell's observation about interest convergence:8 7 just as the legal establishment has rejected civil rights
claims that threaten the position of upper middle class whites, so it is
now rejecting claims that threaten their psyches. 8
This seems like a rather drastic reaction when incarceration and
death are at stake, but then, that is the whole point of denial. And,
as the studies of modem racism would predict, one then justifies
one's opposition to racial change-both to oneself and to the
world-by citing nonracial reasons.8 9 In the context of criminal
procedure decisions, finding a nonracial reason is particularly easy
84 J. KOVEL, supra note 66, at 54-55, 60-61; Crosby, Bromley & Saxe, supra note 70
(reviewing the literature); Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 71, at 84-86 (reviewing results
of number of experiments); Lawrence, supra note 72, at 335; McConahay & Hough, supra
note 68, at 43-44; Pettigrew, supra note 27, at 690.
85 I am self-consciously switching to an indefinite pronoun at this point because the
first person plural would exclude and ignore minority readers, while the second person
plural might imply that I think I have transcended this kind of thinking, which I certainly
cannot claim to have done.
86 See Lawrence, supra note 72, at 321 (describing racism as "both a crime and a
disease"); see also Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1442 n.242 (noting risk that moral condemnation of racism will be eroded as we come to conceptualize racist conduct as culturally
induced rather than consequence of individual choice).
87 Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, 93 HARV.

L. Rav. 518, 523-24 (1980).

Cf Lawrence, supra note 72, at 387 (intent requirement in equal protection doc88
trine is example of Bell's observation that legal establishment does not respond to civil
rights claims that threaten status of privileged whites).
89 Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 71, at 84-86 (drawing conclusions from results of
number of experiments); Pettigrew, supra note 27, at 690 (citing survey data from variety
of contexts that reflect this phenomenon).
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to do: one cites the guilt of the suspect. 90
III
THE BLINDSPOT AND EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE

If I am right about the blindspot of unconscious racism, it
would be surprising if it only affected race and criminal procedure
cases. I think it is largely responsible for the Court's blurred vision
of the heart of traditional equal protection doctrine: the discriminatory purpose/disparate effects distinction. 9 1 As Professor Randall
Kennedy has argued, conventional equal protection precedents
neither compelled nor precluded the outcome in McCleskey. 92 Was
there discriminatory purpose, or more precisely, was discriminatory
purpose proved in McCleskey?
The dissatisfaction with the discriminatory purpose doctrine
has several facets, but a recurring theme in the literature is the difficulty of proving discriminatory purpose.93 Early commentary focused on the ease with which the sophisticated discriminator could
conceal his purposes. 94 This complaint was occasionally buttressed
by the additional observation that the discriminator might not even
be aware of his racial bias. 9 5 More recently, the likelihood of uncon96
scious discrimination has been given greater attention.
The best example of this new focus is a provocative article by
Professor Charles Lawrence entitled The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism.97 Lawrence argues that the
Court should expand equal protection doctrine to include a prohibition against unconscious racial discrimination. 98 He then proposes
90 Justice Powell makes this move openly in his McCleskey opinion. 107 S. Ct. at
1769 ("Moreover, absent far stronger proof, it is unnecessary to seek such a rebuttal,
because a legitimate and unchallenged explanation for the decision is apparent from the
record: McCleskey committed an act for which the United States Constitution and
Georgia laws permit imposition of the death penalty.").
91
See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
92 Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1402-08.
93 See, e.g., Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional
Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977); Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163 (1978); Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of RacialDiscrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977); Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights
and Beyond: DiscriminatoryPurpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961; Simon, Racially Preudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the ConstitutionalBan
Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041 (1978).
94 Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 47-48; Perry, supra note 93, at 551; Schwemm, supra
note 93, at 1031.
95 Binion, "Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 397,
442; Karst, supra note 93, at 1165.
96 See Johnson, supra note 35; Kennedy, supra note 84; Lawrence, supra note 72.
97 Lawrence, supra note 72.
98 Id at 324-27, 344-55.
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that unconscious motivation be assessed by the "cultural meaning"
of the action. 9 9 He reasons that if the culture assigns racial meaning
to an action with racially disparate impact, then the action probably
was subconsciously motivated by racial considerations-and should
therefore be subjected to strict scrutiny.10 0 Lawrence, like most
mainstream equal protection theorists, does not consider examples
from the criminal justice system. 10 1
I think Lawrence's work, and that of other equal protection theorists struggling with the purpose/effects dilemma, would be enriched by examining the criminal justice sphere. One potentially
significant contribution of the race and criminal procedure cases is
documentation of the phenomenon of unconscious racism. The nature of any unconscious process makes absolute proof impossible.
But in this area, there are a variety of data for which no other plausible explanation exists: higher conviction rates of other-race defendants; 10 2 the race-of-victim effect in capital sentencing; 0 3 the
overwhelming propensity of prosecutors to strike black jurors from
cases with black defendants; 10 4 the increased rates of mistaken identification in interracial crimes;' 0 5 and so on.
These data present an opportunity: recognizing the operation
of unconscious racism in the criminal procedure context would pave
the way toward incorporating it into the Court's vision in other
equal protection contexts. The five to four split in McCleskey provides some hope that this kind of data is insistent enough to demand
some acknowledgment, at least if repeatedly proffered. Moreover,
even the public may be somewhat receptive to the concept of unconscious racism if introduced in this realm; although most white Amer99

Id. at 355-62.

Id. at 355-58. Lawrence justifies this inference by referring to psychoanalytic and
cognitivist theory about racial imagery. Id. at 356-57.
101 The jury panel selection cases are occasionally alluded to in discussions of the
role of statistical proof, but even the related question of individual juror selection, so
prominent in the criminal procedure area during the reign of Swain v. Alabama, 408 U.S.
936 (1972) is largely ignored. For an exception, see Wasserstnom, Racism, Sexism, and
Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581 (1977).
102 Johnson, supra note 35, at 1620-22 (reviewing literature); see also id. at 1625-43
(reviewing mock jury studies on race and guilt attribution); Developments, supra note 35, at
1559-60.
103
See McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1763-64 (reviewing the Baldus study); see also Bowers
& Piercd, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME &
DELINQ. 563 (1980) (studying capital sentences in Georgia, Texas, Florida, and Ohio);
Gross & Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparitiesin Capital Sentencing and
Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REv. 27 (1984) (comparing FBI homicide data with
death sentences in eight states from 1976 to 1980); Miller & Hewitt, Conviction of a Defendant as a Function ofJuror-Victim Racial Similarity, 105 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 159 (1978).
104
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103-04 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (reviewing data from four jurisdictions).
105 Johnson, supra note 55, at 937-51 (reviewing the literature).
100
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icans believe that blacks do not need more help from the federal
government or from affirmative action programs, they do acknowledge that discrimination persists in the criminal justice system. 10 6
The second contribution that attention to criminal justice race
cases can make to general equal protection doctrine lies in the insight it can provide into the nature of remedies for unconscious racism, both doctrinal and practical. Doctrinally, I think these cases
argue against Lawrence's "cultural meaning" test for discriminatory
purpose: the salient cultural meaning of criminal justice decisions is
rarely racial even when race has influenced these decisions. This is
partly because criminal justice decisions have so many strong competing meanings that their racial significance can get lost, and it is
partly because the taboo against recognizing racial discrimination in
individual decisions of imprisonment and death is so strong that the
decisionmakers and the public would probably repress the racial significance of these decisions as well as their underlying racial
motivation.
From the vantage point of the race and criminal procedure
cases, it would seem that illuminating equal protection doctrine with
the knowledge of unconscious racism ultimately will not yield a single new test, as Lawrence initially envisioned. 10 7 Instead, I would
foresee escalating doctrinal modifications, beginning with the modest step of abandoning the phrases "discriminatory purpose" and
"purposeful (or intentional) discrimination." As existing decisions
have made clear, these terms of art do not really concern conscious
intent, as the word "purpose" implies,10 8 but were created to stress
the requirement of race-dependent decisions, 109 thus distinguishing
Black and White: A Newsweek Poll, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1988, at 23.
107 Lawrence does not purport to offer a perfected and unalterable proposal.
"Rather, it is [his] hope that... [his article] will stimulate others to think about racism in
106

a new way and will provoke a discussion of how equal protection doctrine can best incorporate this understanding of racism." Lawrence, supra note 72, at 387. I see this Comment as a response to that invitation, and I hope that it furthers the discussion he

envisions.
108
Here I would quibble with Lawrence that current doctrine needs to be expanded
to include unconscious discrimination. By prevailing usage, discriminatory purpose encompasses race-dependent decisions, whether or not the actor is aware that race has
influenced the decisonmaking process. See infra notes 110- 11 and accompanying text.

And, as Lawrence convincingly argues, the justifications for applying heightened scrutiny to racial classifications would not differentiate conscious from unconscious motivation. Lawrence, supra note 72, at 344-55; see also Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of
Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 972-84 (1983)
(arguing that interpreting the purposeful discrimination standard to mean "objective

purpose" explains cases better than does an interpretation relying on decisionmaker's
subjective awareness of invidious motives );Johnson, supra note 35, at 1688-89 (arguing

that Supreme Court's discriminatory purpose standard does not and should not require
proof of conscious motive to discriminate).
109

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976).
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decisions made because of anticipated racial effects rather than in spite
of such effects. 1 0 Because these phrases are particularly inept and
misleading in the context of unconscious race-based decisionmaking, they should be jettisoned. I '
A second and more significant modification would be the expansion of the Arlington Heights list of the kinds of evidence that tend
to prove invidious discrimination. 1 2 The current list, perhaps unsuited to uncovering racism in any form, 1 3 is wholly useless in revealing unconscious, invidious discrimination. A revised list would
include empirically verified indicia of unconscious racism, such as
slips of the tongue, 114 microagressions against the minority race liti116
gant, 1 5 avoidance of face-to-face interactions with minorities,
7
and the adoption of defensive rationalizations.1 It would probably
also include indicators logically deduced from the concept of unconscious racism, just as the current list includes indicators deduced
from the concept of conscious discrimination; l" 8 a prime candidate
would be Lawrence's "cultural meaning" of the action. 119
Eventually, we might see some lessening of the total burden of
proof of invidious discrimination to reflect the ubiquity (and hence,
quite likely influence) of unconscious racism. Perhaps this would be
accomplished simply by giving greater weight to disparate effects,
particularly where there are no truly plausible, nonracial explanations for those effects. Alternatively, some of the post-Arlington
Heights proposals for steering a middle course between a purpose
and effects test might be reevaluated in light of what we learn about
120
the difficulties of proving unconscious discrimination.
On the practical side, the race and criminal procedure cases
110 McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1769 (quoting Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
111 These terms may have other problems, as some of the literature critical of the
discriminatory purpose doctrine has argued. See, e.g., Schnapper, Two Categories of Discriminatory Intent, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31(1982).
112 The Arlington Heights list includes: the impact of the official action, the historical
background of the decisions, the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision, departures from the normal procedural sequence, substantive departures from routine decisions, and contemporary statements made by the
decisionmakers. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266-68 (1977). Justice Powell's opinion states explicitly that the list is not exhaustive.
Id. at 268.
113 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
114
See Lawrence, supra note 72, at 339-41.
115
See Pettigrew, supra note 27, at 690.
116
Id.
117
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
118 The Court offered no empirical evidence for the factors listed in Arlington Heights,
but apparently relied upon logical supposition.
119
Lawrence, supra note 72, at 355-62; see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
120
See, e.g., Binion, supra note 95; Eisenberg, supra note 94.
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clearly show that the shape of the "remedies" ,for unconscious discrimination will not "match" the violation in the same way possible
with conscious discrimination. Justice Stevens struggled in his McCleskey dissent with how to save the death penalty after recognizing
its racially discriminatory character (assuming of course that we

want to save

it).121

Justice Marshall argued that we must eliminate

all preemptory challenges to eliminate their racially selective exercise.' 22 The voir dire cases, even wrongly decided, suggest that we
should be ready to look outside of equal protection jurisprudence,
perhaps consulting due process cases, for more effective remedies. 123 Certainly these problems contain lessons about the necessary breadth of remedies that could be transferred to contexts like
housing discrimination. Solving such problems also may facilitate
the adoption of a radically different view of when and why affirma24
tive action is justified.1
This is not the first time that courts have had to consider unconventional "remedies" for equal protection violations. School
desegregation is the obvious predecessor. 2 5 Then and now, the
McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1806 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
123 Some criminal justice system injuries caused by unconscious racism, such as erroneous convictions stemming from the increased rates of error in cross-racial identifications, may be approachable only through the due process clause, or through
legislative solution, because the racist action is not state action.
124 At the least, it argues for rejection of the premise that affirmative action must be
preceded by identifiable prior discrimination against minorities. I think it also suggests
that other strategies, such as reparations, *mustbe considered if we hope to make progress against white racism. In its current forms, affirmative action allows the majority to
see itself as wronged, rather than as the wrongdoer; moving to remedies that explicitly
declare a compensation rationale might be helpful in altering such perceptions, even at
the margins of consciousness. Obviously, there are other arguments for reparations,
and I do not mean to denigrate them, but only to point out that recognition of the
concept of unconscious racism may serve to breathe new life into those arguments. See
Delgado, The ImperialScholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 561 (1984); Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations, 22
HAtv. C.L.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); see also B. BrrrKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973); Bell, Dissection of a Dream, 9 HARv. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 156, 157 (1974)
("[S]hort of a revolution, the likelihood that blacks today will obtain direct payments in
compensation for their subjugation as slaves before the Emancipation Proclamation, and
their exploitation as quasi-citizens since, is no better than it was in 1866 ....
).
125 The Court called a halt to further remedies in Pasadena Bd. ofEduc. v. Spangler,
427 U.S. 424 (1976), when it reversed a district judge's order to require annual readjustment of attendance zones to achieve racially balanced schools. The justification for this
stopping point was that "having once implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern
in order to remedy the perceived constitutional violations on the part of the defendants,
the District Court had fully performed its function of providing the appropriate remedy
for previous racially discriminatory attendance patterns." Id. at 437. One problem with
this reasoning is that one can hardly believe that the prior discrimination by the school
board had no psychological impact on white parents in terms of their expectations of and
desire for racially segregated schools. Certainly that psychological impact would not
have been remedied by mandating a neutral attendance pattern for a single year.
121
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need for innovative remedies stems from the intransigence of discriminatory conduct. One difference is that with unconscious discrimination, unlike with segregated schools, the intransigence of the
problem can be foreseen at the outset. A second difference is the
knowledge that judicial eradication of this kind of problem is impossible. The judiciary can only ameliorate effects.
CONCLUSION

Several years ago, Justice Powell gave a speech in which he said:
It is of course true that we have witnessed racial injustice in
the past, as has every other country with significant racial diversity. But no one can fairly question the present national commitment to full equality and justice. Racial discrimination, by state
action, is now proscribed by laws and court decisions which protect civil liberties more broadly than in any other country. But
laws alone are not enough. Racial prejudice in the hearts of men
cannot be legislated out of existence; it will pass only in time, and
as human beings of all races learn in humility to respect each
other-a process not furthered by recrimination or undue selfaccusation. 126
This is true, but misleading by virtue of what is missing. Powell is
right that we have made progress; he is right that recrimination is
not helpful. To the extent, however, that these remarks imply that
our history of racial discrimination is now irrelevant, he is wrong. It
is also wrong to call our efforts to eradicate this discrimination "unceasing," as he does in McCleskey. 12 7 They should be unceasing, and
at least in the criminal justice sphere, this involves a shift in focus
from individual guilt to collective responsibility. The next stage requires recognition that racism is always wrong even when it is not
morally blameworthy. In this next stage, we will attempt to control
racial discrimination without first looking to whether we should con1 28
demn the discriminator.
I say "next stage" with some optimism, perhaps unfounded
Although the school desegregation cases expanded our earlier notions of remedies, the
ultimate line drawing in those cases can hardly be described as enlightened. See id at
442-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (unitary system had not been established).
126 N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1972, § 1, at 33, col. 3.
127
107 S. Ct. at 1775.
128
The recognition that it is possible to separate the behavior from the actor long
ago transformed the substantive criminal law. Excuses such as insanity were recognized
and the harmdoer was distinguished from the wrongdoer. The net of criminal responsibility was thus narrowed. We need to make that distinction with regard to racial discrimination, thus broadening the net of social responsibility. It is worth noting that insanity
acquitees, while not subject to the moral opprobrium implied by a criminal conviction,
are nevertheless subject to civil restraint because of the necessity of protecting the
community.
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given my hypothesized explanation of the blindspot. Still, I think
progress is possible. In self-esteem terms, it requires that the
Court-and the rest of us-shift from pride in what we have done
and who we are now, to pride in what we are trying to do and the
kind of people we are yearning to be.

